Abstract. We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then de®ne a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
Introduction
In his seminal paper Wilson (1978) analyzes an economy with asymmetric information and proposes a de®nition of the Core. The di½culty raised by economies with asymmetric information stems from two factors: ®rst, agents evaluate bundles after they have received their information, and secondly, not all of them have the same information. If agents evaluated bundles before their private information is revealed to them or, if all agents received the same information, we would face a special case of Arrow-Debreu economies and need no new de®nition of the Core. Wilson (1978) notes that when information is asymmetric, it is not enough for each member of a coalition to know that he prefers one allocation over another in order for a coalition to improve upon the latter. It must be commonly known by all members of the coalition that this is so. The requirement that the improvement be common knowledge is needed because agents necessarily learn that they are improving upon an allocation when they are doing so, and they must still be willing to transact after they have learned whatever they have learned. The important question is: With respect to what information structure should an improvement be common knowledge?
When there are no opportunities for communication, the proper response to the question above is: with respect to the agents' initial information. For if there is no information transmission, the agents cannot re®ne their initial information and consequently, a coalition can improve upon an allocation only if it is self-evident that they can enforce something better. Wilson's Coarse Core takes these circumstances into account. When opportunities for communication are allowed, on the other hand, the relevant information is the initial information re®ned by the information transmission that has taken place. Wilson's Fine Core takes this into account and allows for unlimited communication among agents.
The possibilities of communication are exogenously given in the de®nition of both the Coarse and the Fine core. In this paper we want to make the information transmission endogenous. The idea is that while it may not be common knowledge that a given allocation is strictly preferred by the members of some coalition, it may become common knowledge after all of them express their willingness to trade. That is, if agents are allowed to repeatedly express their willingness to carry out a trade, the common desirability of one allocation over another may become common knowledge. The information transmission is endogenous because it follows from the comparison of two given allocations, and di¨erent allocations will give rise to di¨erent information transmissions. The way the information is transmitted and common knowledge is thus achieved, is similar to the processes by which posteriors converge in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and in Bacharach (1985) .1 When we allow for the kind of endogenous information transmission described above, we are lead to a de®nition of the Core that is intermediate between the Coarse Core and the Fine Core.
As Wilson (1978) notes, the opportunities for communication may disrupt arrangements for mutual insurance, resulting in the emptiness of the Core. This is true for both the Fine Core and for our Core with endogenous communication. But there is another disruption that the opportunities for communication may cause, and it is related to the credibility of the improvements. Speci®cally, there are allocations outside the Core with communication that cannot be improved upon in a credible way. Namely, whenever they are improved upon by a coalition S by means of an allocation y and after some information transmission has taken place, there is a subcoalition of S that can use its new information and improve upon y by means of some other assignment of bundles z. This problem raises the question of what the allocations that cannot be improved upon in an internally consistent way are. When the sort of endogenous information transmission described above is allowed, the answer is what we call the Internally Consistent Core.
The Internally Consistent Core clearly contains the Core with endogenous communication, but there is no inclusion relation with the Coarse Core. The fact that it is not a subset of the Coarse Core may be surprising at ®rst sight, but it is a natural consequence of allowing communication. For example an allocation y that is commonly known to be strictly preferred to another allocation x when they are evaluated with the initial information may not be credible, because a subcoalition may improve upon the former using some communication which may be insu½cient to improve upon the latter.
Although the Coarse Core, the Core with communication, and the Internally Consistent Core are di¨erent concepts, the improvements on which they are based essentially coincide when we restrict attention to the grand coalition and to one-person coalitions. This allows us to prove a modi®ed version of the No Trade Theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982) for an early version of the theorem).
In this paper, as in Wilson (1978) , we abstract from incentive problems. Implicit in the de®nition of an allocation is the assumption that the states are veri®able. We do this because we want to focus on the topic of endogenous information transmission and the appropriate concept of improvements. For a paper that takes into account incentive problems and thus restricts attention to the allocations that are incentive compatible, see Vohra (1999) . A more related paper is Dutta and Vohra (1997) which, while restricting attention to incentive compatible allocations, attempts to endogenize the information transmission. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) and Krasa (1999) deal with endogenous communication, but they restrict attention to the grand coalition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of an economy with asymmetric information and the allocations that we consider. Section 3 discusses several notions of improving allocations, which di¨er only in the communication possibilities they allow. When the transmission of information is endogenous, the corresponding notion of improving allocations gives rise to the Core with endogenous communication. After noting that some improvements with endogenous communication may not be internally consistent, Section 4 uses the Core with endogenous communication as a building block to de®ne the Internally Consistent Core, which is the main concept of the paper. The central message of the paper is conveyed in Example 3, which shows that belonging to the Coarse Core is not a necessary condition for stability when endogenous communication is allowed.
Economies
Let be a ®nite set with generic element o. The set represents the set of possible states of the world, and o represents one such state. Subsets of are called events. A commodity vector is an element of R l . A bundle is a function x i X 3 R l that assigns a commodity vector to each state of the world. We denote the set of bundles by B. An agent i is a fourtuple (P i Y u i Y e i Y m i ) where P i is a partition of that represents i's information u i X R l Â 3 R is agent i's state contingent utility function e i X 3 R l is agent i's state contingent initial endowment of commodities m i is a strictly positive probability measure on that represents agent i's prior beliefs.
For each partition of , we denote by o the element of that contains o. For each bundle x i A B we denote by u i x i the function u i x i X 3 Rju i x i o u i x i oY o. Let i be a partition of and let x i X 3 R be a bundle. Agent i's conditional expected utility of x i relative to i is the function E m i u i x i j i X 3 R that assigns to each state o, agent i's conditional expectation of u i x i given the event i o, namely
Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions.
De®nition 2. Let S be a coalition. An information structure for S is a collection i i A S of partitions of , one partition for each agent in S.
Information structures for N are called simply information structures. Let i i A S be an information structure for S. The meet of the partitions i i A S is the ®nest partition of that is coarser than each i , i A S, and it is denoted by S 5 i A S i . Similarly, the join of the partitions i i A S is the coarsest partition that is ®ner than each i , i A S and is denoted by 4 i A S i . An event E is said to be common knowledge among the members of S at o with respect to information structure i i A S if S o J E. If an information structure is not speci®ed, it should be understood that we mean the initial information partitions P i . The formal de®nition of common knowledge was ®rst introduced by Aumann (1976) .
De®nition 3. Let S be a coalition. An assignment of bundles to agents in S is a function y X S 3 B.
be an economy and let S be a coalition. An S-allocation is an assignment of bundles to agents in S such that i A S yi i A S e i . S-allocations represent all those redistributions of their endowments that coalition S can carry out without the consent of others. N-allocations are simply called allocations. Denote the set of all S-allocations by AS and the set of allocations by A. If y is an assignment of bundles to agents in S and T J S, we shall write y T for the projection of y on T and, with a slight abuse of notation, y i for yi.
We say that allocation x is individually rational if
We say that allocation x is strictly e½cient if there is no allocation y A A and no state o Ã A such that
with strict inequality at o Ã for some i A N.
We say that allocation x is e½cient if there is no allocation y A A and no state o Ã A such that
with strict inequality at o Ã for all i A N. We say that allocation x is weakly e½cient if there is no allocation y A A and no state o Ã A such that
A standard argument shows that when preferences are continuous and strictly monotonic at every state of the world the concepts of strict e½ciency and e½ciency coincide. Weak e½ciency, however, is not identical to e½ciency even when agents' preferences are continuous and strictly monotonic at every state of the world as the following example demonstrates. . The agents' utility functions are constant across states and given by u i aY b ab, for i 1Y 2. The initial endowments and information partitions are described in the following table, which also contains a feasible allocation y.
Endowment e
Allocation y
The initial endowment is not an e½cient allocation because allocation y dominates it: both agents are better o¨at state o 2 without being hurt at state o 1 . On the other hand the initial endowment is weakly e½cient because it is impossible to make agent 1 better o¨in state o 1 .
A su½cient condition for the three e½ciency concepts to coincide is that the agents' preferences be continuous and strictly monotonic at every state of the world and that the agents's consumption sets be open subsets of R l . For in this case, if one agent can be made better o¨at one state, say o, without hurting anybody at any state in P N o, then it is possible to design a system of transfers that makes everybody better o¨at every sate in P N o.
The existence of individually rational and strictly e½cient allocations is guaranteed if the individuals' utility functions are continuous (see Wilson (1978) for details).
Improvements
In this section we present several ways ± which di¨er in the degree of communication allowed ± a coalition can improve upon an allocation. The ®rst notion is due to Wilson (1978) and allows no communication between the agents. In order for a coalition to improve upon an allocation it must be common knowledge among the members of the coalition, with respect to their initial information partitions, that they can enforce an S-allocation that is strictly preferred by all of them.
De®nition 7. Let T be a coalition, let x be an assignment of bundles to agents in T, and let i i A T be an information structure for T. Let S J T be another coalition. We say that S-allocation y A AS is a coarse improvement of S upon x with respect to information structure
When y is a coarse improvement of S upon x with respect to i i A T at some o A , we say that x is improved upon by S with respect to i i A T .
Associated with the notion of coarse improvements, we have the de®nition of the Coarse Core.
De®nition 8. The Coarse Core of the economy E with respect to information structure i i A N is the set of its allocations that cannot be improved upon with respect to i i A N by any coalition.
The Coarse Core of the economy E with respect to information structure
The second notion is appropriate when agents have unlimited communication possibilities. By unlimited communication possibilities we mean that each coalition has a set of feasible communication systems at its disposal (see Wilson (1978) , Section 3), which is rich enough to enable the coalition to use any of the information structures between the initial one and the coarsest common re®nement of the initial one.
be an economy and let x be an allocation in it. We say that S-allocation y is a ®ne improvement of S upon x if there is an information structure k k A S for S such that for all i A S, i is not coarser than P i for all i A S, i is not ®ner than 4 k A S P k and with respect to which y is a coarse improvement of S upon x S .
Associated with ®ne improvements, we have the notion of the Fine Core, found in Wilson (1978) .
De®nition 10. The Fine Core of the economy E is the set of all its allocations that cannot be ®nely improved upon by any coalition.
We want to introduce a notion of improvement, that allows for some, but not unlimited, communication. To understand our notion, note that in order for an S-allocation y to be a coarse improvement upon x, it must be common knowledge without communication that y is strictly preferred to x by all agents in S. Also, in order for y to be a ®ne improvement upon x, it should be possible to redistribute the information initially held by the members of the coalition in such a way that no one learns more than what can be learned by pooling all the information, no one forgets what he knows, and ®nally, in such a way that makes it common knowledge that y is strictly preferred to x. Our notion lies somewhere in the middle since it does not allow unlimited information transmission. We allow only the transmission of information that takes place when the agents repeatedly agree to carry out the transaction. The fact that y is strictly preferred to x by all members of S should become common knowledge after a long handshake during which the agents ratify their willingness to take y instead of x. Only after this long handshake can we say that it became common knowledge that y is better than x. In order to formalize the idea we need a piece of notation.
Let f and g be two functions on . We denote the event at which f b g by f b g. Namely,
c . Also, we denote by P f b g the partition generated by f b g, namely
De®nition 11. Let T be a coalition, let x be an assignment of bundles to agents in T, let i i A T be an information structure for T, and let S J T be a coalition. Let y A AS be an S-allocation and de®ne the information structures for S, S i n i A S , for n 0Y 1Y 2Y F F F Y recursively as follows:
We say that h yY
Implicit in the above de®nition is a``dialogue'' in the sense of Bacharach (1985) . In this dialogue agents repeatedly communicate their willingness to perform a trade. In order for h yY S i i A S i to be an improvement of S upon hxY i i A N i at o, the following should hold:
1. All agents in S should prefer y to x at o when they evaluate these assignments according to the information structure i 2. All agents in S should prefer y to x at o when they evaluate these assignments according to the information structure that results from the re®ne-ment of i with the information that all the previous items hold 3. The same as above, and so on ad in®nitum.
Note that in order for y to be part of an improvement upon x, it must be the case that the agents prefer y to x during the whole dialogue. An alternative de®nition would require only that the agents prefer y to x in the limit, that is, independently of the answers along the dialogue.
Clearly, since the individual partitions are assumed to be ®nite, the re®ne-ment process just described ends after a ®nite number of rounds. More formally, by the de®nition of the partitions S i n, the sequence f S i ng n A N is non-decreasing. Since the state space is ®nite, there must be a step M A N such that for all n b M we have 
Remark 1. Assume h yY S i i A S i is an improvement of S upon hxY i i A N i at some o, then y is a coarse improvement of S upon x S with respect to the information structure S i i A S . Namely, it became common knowledge among the members of S that x is strictly preferred to y.
Proof: Since h yY S i i A S i is an improvement upon hxY i i A S i at o we have
This, together with equality (1), implies that
which means that it is common knowledge with respect to The previous remark allows us to say that if h yY S i i A S i is an improvement of S upon hxY i i A N i at some o, then it can become common knowledge among the members of S that x is strictly preferred to y.
In order to understand the de®nition of an improvement, consider the following example. . The agents' utility functions are constant across states and given by u i aY b ab, for i 1Y 2Y 3. The initial endowments and information partitions are described in the following table, which also contains a feasible allocation y.
Endowment e
The expected utilities of each agent, derived from the above allocations, are given by:
Eu 1 e 1 jP 1 f 1a3 1 a3 1 a3g f 1g Eu 1 y 1 jP 1 f 2a3 2 a3 2 a3g f 0g Eu 2 e 2 jP 2 f 0 0 g f 1a2 1 a2g Eu 2 y 2 jP 2 f 1 1 g f 1 1 g Eu 3 e 3 jP 3 f 0g f 1a3 1 a3 1 a3g Eu 3 y 3 jP 3 f 1g f 2a3 2 a3 2 a3g
At no state of the world is it common knowledge that all agents prefer the assignment y to the assignment e, because at state o 4 agent 1 strictly prefers x to y. Consequently, y is not a coarse improvement of N upon the endowment.
Assume, however, that the true state is o 1 . At this state all three agents prefer y to x. Since this is true for all states except for o 4 , it becomes common knowledge, after y has not been rejected by any agent, that state o 4 is not the true state.
This gives rise to the following information structure: 
Note that all agents prefer y to x except for agent 2 at state o 3 (o 4 is irrelevant at this stage, since it became common knowledge that it did not occur). Consequently, it becomes apparent at this stage (do not forget that we are at o 1 ) that o 3 is not the true state. This gives rise to the following information structure:
1 2 ffo 1 Y o 2 gY fo 3 gY fo 4 gg 2 2 ffo 1 Y o 2 gY fo 3 gY fo 4 gg 3 2 ffo 1 gY fo 2 gY fo 3 gY fo 4 gg
The corresponding expected utilities, with respect to the updated information structure is given by:
At this point it becomes common knowledge that the true state is o 1 , because if the true state were o 2 , agent 3 would prefer x to y, while at o 1 all three agents prefer y to x. We can conclude that: Allocation y together with the limit information structure i 3 ffo 1 gY fo 2 gY fo 3 gY fo 4 ggY i 1Y 2Y 3 is an improvement of N upon hxY P i i A N i.
The above de®nition of an improvement leads to the following de®nition of a core with endogenous communication.
De®nition 12. The Core with endogenous communication, or simply the Core, of E is the set of all allocations x A A, such that hxY P i i A N i is not improved upon by any coalition.
Given the motivation of the Core, the next two propositions can hardly be surprising.
Proposition 1. The core of an economy is a subset of its Coarse Core.
Proof: Assume that x is an allocation that is not in the Coarse Core of the economy. Then there exists an S-allocation y and a state o at which it is common knowledge among the members of S that y is preferred to x by each of them. But then h yY P i i A S i is an improvement of S upon hxY P i i A S i at o, since nothing can be learned from the fact that all agents strictly prefer y to x. r Proposition 2. The Fine Core of an economy is a subset of its Core.
Proof: Let E be an economy with set of agents N. Assume that allocation x is not in the Core of E. This means that there is a coalition S J N with an improvement upon hxY P i i A N i. Let h yY S i i A S i be that improvement. This means that y coarsely improves upon x S with respect to S i i A S . Moreover, by construction, for all i A S, S i is not coarser than P i and not ®ner than 4 k A S P k . Consequently y is a ®ne improvement upon x. r
Internally consistent improvements
A question that has been asked in the context of perfect information is whether the S-allocations that are used to improve upon other allocations are themselves immune to deviations of some of the members of S. Improvements that are immune to internal deviations are internally consistent.2 Ray (1989) showed that in the context of perfect information, it is always possible to ®nd internally consistent improvements upon allocations that are not in the Core. In this section we want to answer the same question but for the context of economies with asymmetric information. As we shall see, Ray's result still holds, as long as there is no communication. As soon as communication is allowed, we'll be able to ®nd allocations outside the core that are not improved upon by any internally consistent improvement.
De®nition 13. Let x A AT be a T-allocation, let i i A T be an information structure, and let S J T be a coalition. We say that y A AS is an internally consistent coarse improvement of S upon x with respect to i i A T at o A . when jSj 1, if y is a coarse improvement upon x with respect to i i A T at o . when jSj b 1, if y is a coarse improvement upon x with respect to i i A T at o such that there is no coalition F PS with an internally consistent coarse improvement upon y with respect to i i A S at o.
The following result is the extension of Ray (1989) to economies with asymmetric information. Theorem 1. Let E be an economy with asymmetric information, let x be an allocation in it and let i i A N be an information structure. The following statements are equivalent:
i. There is a coalition with a coarse improvement upon x with respect to i i A N ii. There is a coalition with an internally consistent coarse improvement upon x with respect to i i A N .
Proof: i 3 ii. Assume there is a coalition S J N with a coarse improvement upon x at some o Ã . Namely, there is an S-allocation y and event
If y is an internally consistent coarse improvement of S upon x at o Ã , we are done. So assume that there is a coalition T P S and an internally consistent coarse improvement z of T upon y at o Ã . Namely there is a T-allocation z and an
Ã and for all i A T, which means that z is an internally consistent coarse improvement of T upon x as well. ii 3 i. An internally consistent coarse improvement is, in particular, a coarse improvement. r
Next we want to extend the notion of internal consistency to the improvements that de®ne the Core with endogenous communication.
De®nition 14. Let x A AT be a T-allocation, let i i A T be an information structure, and let S J T be a coalition. We say that h yY
When h yY S i i A S i is an internally consistent improvement of S upon hxY i i A N i at some o, we say that x is improved upon by S in an internally consistent way.
De®nition 15. The Internally Consistent Core of E is the set of all allocations x A A such that hxY P i i A N i is not improved upon by any coalition in an internally consistent way.
The following proposition shows that the previous de®nition is not superuous.
Proposition 3. The Core of an economy is a subset of its Internally Consistent Core and the reverse inclusion does not necessarily hold.
Proof: Since an internally consistent improvement is also an improvement, it is clear that the Core is a subset of the Internally Consistent Core. To see that the reverse inclusion does not necessarily hold, consider the following economy, taken from Wilson (1978) . There are three agents, each with the same constant across states utility function, given by ua a p . There is a common prior given by the uniform distribution over the states space. Consider allocation x in the next Allocation x is not in the Core because coalition S f1Y 2g has an improvement at o 1 which is given by the S-allocation y and the information structure The improvement h yY S i i A S i is not internally consistent since it is improved upon by agent 2 at o 1 in an internally consistent way by means of his own endowment.
The same kind of argument can be made for every improvement upon hxY P i i A N i. This shows that x belongs to the Internally Consistent Core of the economy.3 r
The above example gives evidence of the superiority of the Internally Consistent Core over the Core. The economy has an empty Core, but the improvements that disqualify allocation x are not credible. In any case, the previous result raises the question of what is the appropriate concept of the core when communication is allowed.4 Fortunately, however, the basic concepts of individual rationality and e½ciency are not seriously in¯uenced by the possibility of communication as the following propositions show. Proof:
Remark 1 there is some information structure i i A N , ®ner than P i i A N , with respect to which it becomes common knowledge at some o Ã that everybody prefers y to x. In other words,
De®ne the allocation z by
It is not di½cult to see that z dominates x and as a result x cannot be e½cient. ii. If there is no improvement, you will never ®nd an internally consistent one. iii. Assume that x is not a weakly e½cient allocation. Then there is an allocation y and state o Ã at which it is common knowledge that y is better than x in the eyes of all the agents. But this implies that y is an improvement of the grand coalition upon x. r
Since when the agents' utility functions are continuous and strictly increasing at every state of the world, and when their consumption sets are open subsets of R l the concepts of e½ciency and weak e½ciency are equivalent, it follows from Proposition 5 that an allocation is e½cient if and only if the grand coalition does not have an improvement upon it. In other words, in this case the standard concept of e½ciency remains valid even after enabling agents to communicate. Then there is no allocation y that can become commonly known to be strictly preferred to x by all agents.
Proof: Since x is e½cient, by Proposition 5 there is no allocation y and state o at which it can become common knowledge that y is preferred to x by all agents. r
The well-known No-Trade Theorem (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982) , Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) or Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) for di¨erent versions) states that if an allocation is ex-ante e½cient, it must be (interim) e½cient as well. The interpretation is that if the agents traded in contingent commodities before they get their private information, and they reached an ex-ante e½cient allocation, then after they get their private information, from wherever it may come, it is impossible to ®nd a reallocation that is commonly known to be preferred by all agents. Our modi®ed no-trade theorem is di¨erent in that the starting point is a stage at which the individuals already got their private information and in that some information transmission is allowed. Our theorem says that if the allocation is (interim) e½cient (and not necessarily ex-ante e½cient), it is impossible for the agents to ®nd an allocation that, even after some dialogue takes place, becomes common knowledge to be strictly preferred to the former. Not only is new information incapable of inducing trade, but endogenous communication between the asymmetrically informed agents is incapable as well.
Corollary 1 shows that for two-person economies, the Internally Consistent Core is a subset of the Coarse Core. In general, however, there is no inclusion relation whatsoever, as the following example shows. The endowment e is not in the Coarse Core because the allocation y below is commonly known (at every state) to be strictly preferred to e by all agents. Moreover, it can be checked that y belongs to the Coarse Core. Allocation y, however, does not form part of an internally consistent improvement upon e because coalition S f1Y 2g has the following internally consistent improvement upon it at o 2 . To see this, note that if o 2 is the true state of the world, both agents prefer z to y (z provides them with an expected utility of 7). Since o 2 is the only state at which both agents prefer z to y, they learn from their mutual agreement that the state is indeed o 2 , and it becomes common knowledge that z is preferred to y by both of them. Moreover, z is a``credible'' S-allocation because it cannot be improved upon by any singleton at o 2 . What happens is that, even though allocation y is very attractive, agent 3 fears that at o 2 it will become common knowledge between agents 1 and 2 that they can run away with 7 units each, leaving agent 3 in the cold. This justi®ed fear is what destabilizes allocation y. Agent 3 does not give in to the alluring powers of allocation y and rejects it.
Consequently, y is not in the Internally Consistent Core. This shows that the Coarse Core is not a subset of the Internally Consistent Core. On the other hand, allocation z does not form part of an internally consistent improvement upon e. Moreover, the initial endowment belongs to the Internally Consistent Core. To see this, note that no pair of agents that contains agent 3 can improve upon the endowment since no agent can individually increase agent's 3 utility. It is not di½cult to check that agents 1 and 2 cannot ®nd an improvement upon the endowment. And ®nally all the improvements of the grand coalition are not internally consistent because an internally consistent improvement upon them similar to the one in the example can be found. This shows that the Internally Consistent Core is not a subset of the Coarse Core.
